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Parental Consent Abortion Statutes: The
Limits of State Power
In 1976 the Supreme Court in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth' held un-
constitutional a provision of a Missouri abortion statute2 which required the
consent of a parent or person in loco parentis before an abortion could be
performed on an unmarried woman under the age of 18, unless the abortion
was necessary to preserve the life of the mother. In reaching its decision the
Court stated: "[T]he State does not have the constitutional authority to give a
third party an absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto over the decision of the
physician and his patient to terminate the [minor] patient's pregnancy
.... ,,3 On the same day as the Planned Parenthood decision, however, the
Court in Bellotti v. Baird4 held that a somewhat different parental consent
provision in a Massachusetts abortion statute5 was susceptible of an inter-
pretation which might be constitutional. s This statute also required parental
consent before an abortion could be performed on a minor, but it further
provided that a court order could be substituted for the parental consent if
such consent were denied and if the court found the abortion to be in the
'428 U.S. 52 (1976).
2Mo. REV. STAT. § 188.020 (Supp. 1977). This statute provides in part:
No abortion shall be performed prior to the end of the first twelve weeks of
pregnancy except:
(1) By a duly licensed, consenting physician in the exercise of his best clinical
medical judgment;
(2) After the woman, prior to submitting to the abortion, certifies in writing
her consent to the abortion and that her consent is informed and freely given and is
not the result of coercion;
(3) With the written consent of the woman's spouse, unless the abortion is cer-
tified by a licensed physician to be necessary in order to preserve the life of the
mother;
(4) With the written consent of one parent or person in loco parentis of the
woman if the woman is unmarried and under the age of eighteen years, unless the
abortion is certified by a licensed physician as necessary in order to preserve the life of
the mother.
-428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976).
1428 U.S. 132 (1976).
5MASS. ANN. LAWS. ch. 112, § 12P (Michie/Law. Co-op 1975). This statute provides in
part:
(1) If the mother is less than eighteen years of age and has not married, the
consent of both the mother and her parents is required. If one or both of the mother's
parents refuse such consent, consent may be obtained by order of a judge of the
superior court for good cause shown, after such hearing as he deems necessary. Such a
hearing will not require the appointment of a guardian for the mother.
6in Baird, the Supreme Court vacated the district court's decision, which had held the
consent provision unconstitutional, holding that the district court should have abstained. 428
U.S. at 134. The case was subsequently certified to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
for its construction of the statute. See note 18 infra. The United States Supreme Court found
abstention to be appropriate because the statute was susceptible of an interpretation which would
avoid or substantially modify the federal constitutional challenge to the statute. 428 U.S. at
147-48. Cf. Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 177 (1959).
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
best interests of the minor. In remanding the case for certification to the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court for an interpretation of the statute, the
Supreme Court stated that such a statute clearly was "susceptible to [an] in-
terpretation ... [which] would avoid or substantially modify the federal con-
stitutional challenge to the statute .. .
These cases have not resolved the issue of whether a state may require
parental consent or consultation before an abortion can be performed on a
minor. The Court has ruled that while a minor's decision to have an abortion
is protected by her right of privacy,8 a statute limiting the exercise of this
decision may be upheld if it does not substantially infringe on that right of
privacy or if the statute protects a compelling state interest. However, no firm
guidelines in this area have come from the Court. The states are still in a
position of uncertainty regarding the permissible limits of their regulation of
a minor's decision to have an abortion. It is the purpose of this note to ex-
amine the justifications for upholding a parental consent statute9 and to
define the present constitutional limits on statutes requiring parental con-
sultation or consent before an abortion can be performed on an unmarried
minor.' 0 An analysis of the possible interests a state may further in justifica-
tion of such statutes will lead to the conclusion that no interest of sufficient
1428 U.S. at 148.
'Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976).
'The implications of this analysis may also be applied to the broader question of the
desirability and constitutionality of parental consent requirements in a variety of contexts, e.g.
with regard to other medical procedures, or to the dispensing of contraceptives to minors. Two
recent cases regarding the dispensation of contraceptives to minors, for example, cited both
Planned Parenthood and Baird. The Supreme Court, in Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l. 97 S.
Ct. 2010 (1977), struck down a New York statute which prohibited the distribution of non-
prescription contraceptives to persons under sixteen years of age except by a physician. But in
Doe v. Irwin, 428 F. Supp. 1198 (W.D. Mich. 1977), a federal district court held that a state
funded family planning center could not dispense birth control devices to unemancipated minors
without first notifying the minor's parents.
'"While this note deals with the infringement on the minor's right of privacy protected by
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, statutes requiring parental consultation or
consent before an abortion can be performed on an unmarried minor also involve several
classifications which may be violative of the equal protection clause. Some of these classifications
involve distinctions
(1) between married and unmarried minors seeking abortions,
(2) between unmarried adult women and unmarried minors seeking abortions, and
(3) between unmarried minors seeking abortions and unmarried minors seeking other
medical treatment.
Since "privacy" rights have been found to be fundamental and protected by the due process
clause, it is plausible that these rights are also fundamental for purposes of equal protection
clause analysis. See Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065 (1969),
where the author notes: "Probably every interest found to be fundamental and therefore pro-
tected by the due process clause will also be fundamental under the equal protection clause, so
that unequal treatment with respect to that interest would be upheld only on a very strong show-
ing of justification." Id. at 1130. The showing required for equal protection analysis would be
similar to that required under the due process clause, which is discussed in detaiT in thfis note.
The classifications, to be valid, must be necessary to the achievement of a compelling state in-
terest, Shapiro v. Thompson. 394 U.S. 618. 634 (1969), aid musi be narroiv'ldrawn to achieve
that interest. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
For an analysis of whether such statutes can withstand an equal protection challenge, see State v.
Koome, 84 Wash.2d 901, 530 P.2d 260, 66-68 (1975).
[Vol. 52:837
ABORTION STATUTES
stature is served by requiring a minor to obtain either parental consultation
or consent as a prerequisite to obtaining an abortion.
THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY OF MINORS
In Planned Parenthood the Court determined that minors are protected
by the right of privacy," a right which previously had been held to encom-
pass a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy.12 Thus it should be
"428 U.S. at 75. Although not mentioned specifically in the Constitution, an individual's
right of privacy has been recognized in a long line of decisions of the United States Supreme
Court. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965); Aptheker v. Secretary of
State, 378 U.S. 500, 508 (1964); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960). In Griswold v.
Connecticut, the Court explained that the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights (including the
first, third, fourth, and fifth amendments) "have penumbras, formed by emanations from those
guarantees that help give them life and substance." 381 U.S. at 484. These penumbras create
zones of personal privacy with respect to various aspects of a person's life, including marriage,
Loving v. Virginia 388 U.S. 1 (1967): contraception. Eisenstadt v. Baird. 405 U.S. 438 (1972):
procreation, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); child rearing and education, Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
In response to the state's contentions that a child did not have the right or ability to con-
sent to an abortion, the Court in Planned Parenthood stated:
We agree . . . that the State may not impose a blanket provision . . . requiring the
consent of a parent or person in loco parentis as a condition for abortion of an unmar-
ried minor during the first 12 weeks of her pregnancy .... [T]he State does not have
the constitutional authority to give a third party an absolute, and possibly arbitrary,
veto over the decision of the physician and his patient to terminate the patient's
pregnancy, regardless of the reason for withholding the consent.
Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only when
one attains the state-defined age of maturity. Minors, as well as adults, are protected
by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights.
428 U.S. at 74.
Courts have made some distinctions in their application of constitutional rights to minors.
They have dealt with the applicability of rights to minors on a case by case basis, where the issue
is raised with respect to a particular constitutional guarantee. See, e.g., Breed v. Jones. 421 U.S.
519 (1975) (right to be free from double jeopardy); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (students
held to possess property and liberty interests protected by the fourteenth amendment). This ap-
proach leaves the Court free to find that rights secured to adults may not be applicable to
minors, when such application would not serve the best interests of the minor or the state. See
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971), where the Court held that a trial by jury was not
constitutionally required in the adjudicative phase of a juvenile court delinquency proceeding,
since to do so would work to the detriment rather than the benefit of the minor by undercutting
the purposes of the juvenile court system. The holding in Planned Parenthood, that the right to
determine whether or not to terminate one's pregnancy is applicable to minors, evinces a prima
facie determination that the exercise of the protected right will work to the benefit rather than
the detriment of the minor. If that were not the case, the Court could have held that a minor is
not protected by the right to determine whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.
12The right of a woman to decide whether or not to terminate her pregnancy is a fun-
damental right, included within the right of privacy, because of the far-reaching effects on a
woman's life should the state deny her this choice:
The detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant woman by denying this
choice altogether is apparent. Specific and direct harm medically diagnosable even in
early pregnancy may be involved. Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon
the woman a distressful life and future. Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental
and physical health may be taxed by child care. There is also the distress, for all con-
cerned, associated with the unwanted child, and there is the problem of bringing a
child into a family already unable, psychologically and othenvise, to care for it. In
1977]
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settled that a minor possesses the right to determine whether or not to ter-
minate her pregnancy.13 In order for a minor to challenge the constitutionali-
ty of a statute which requires parental consultation or consent before she may
obtain an abortion, she must initially demonstrate that the statute infringes
upon that right.
Statutes prohibiting a woman from obtaining an abortion clearly infringe
on the woman's exercise of her constitutionally protected right.14 Absent a
compelling state interest necessitating such a measure, such a statute could
not stand.' 5 A statute such as that of Missouri, which allows abortions on
minors only where the minor obtains parental consent, in effect gives the
Parents a veto over the minor's decision to terminate her pregnancy.16 Such a
statute operates in much the same manner as a statute prohibiting abortion,
by completely overriding the decision of the woman on whom the abortion is
to be performed. This the Court held in Planned Parenthood is an un-
constitutional infringement of the minor's right of privacy.' 7
A somewhat different situation is presented by a statute such as that of
Massachusetts. While the statute requires a minor to attempt to obtain paren-
tal consent' before an abortion can be performed on her, it allows a minor
who feels that consent has been withheld contrary to her own best interests to
petition the court to authorize her abortion. The necessity of parental consent
may thereby be obviated. This type of statute has been characterized by the
other cases . . . the additional difficulties and continuing stigma of unwed motherhood
may be involved.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
"
5 All of the same detriments cited by the Court in Roe apply to an equal or greater extent
to the denial of this choice to minors, since the medical risks of pregnancy and childbirth are
even greater with respect to minors than to adults. Pilpel and Wechsler, Birth Control,
Teenagers and the Law, 1 FAMILY PLAN. PERSPECTIVES 29 (1969). In addition, most pregnant
teengagers are unmarried, so that the stigma and difficulties of unwed motherhood may become
involved. The disruption, by motherhood, of educational opportunities and other activities im-
portant to the development of the minor will be great in many cases.
4Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
15The Court in Roe said that "[w]here certain fundamental rights are involved, the Court
has held that regulation limiting these rights may be justified only by a 'compelling state in-
terest.' "Id. at 155. See also Shapiro v. Thompson. 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969); 'Grswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 497 (1965).




8 The state in Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976), argued that the Massachusetts statute
would preserve the "mature minor rule" in Massachusetts, according to which a child determined
by the court to be capable of giving informed consent would be allowed to do so. 428 U.S. at
144. Under this construction of the statute, a pregnant minor who considered herself to be within
the mature minor rule could petition the court for authorization for an abortion "regardless of
whether the parents had been consulted or had withheld their consent." Id. The Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts, however, in its construction of the statute, held that the mature
minor rule would not apply, and therefore a showing of parental refusal to consent was necessary
to initiate the court proceedings. Baird v. Attorney Gen., 360 N.E.2d 288, 294 (Mass. 1977).
The appellants' construction of the statute remains relevant, however, since it was this in-




Supreme Court as one which "prefers parental consultation and consent," but
is "fundamentally different from a statute that creates a 'parental veto.' "19
Such a statute however is very similar to an outright parental veto
statute. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has itself characterized
the statute as a form of veto. While agreeing that there was no absolute veto
inherent in the Massachusetts statute, it commented that the word "veto"
might be used in describing the statute "by analogy to the legislative process,
a veto which may be overriden. 120 This latter characterization is more ac-
curate, since a minor must consult her parents and attempt to obtain their
consent as a prerequisite to initiating the judicial review procedure. 21 Thus,
the parents' refusal to consent does act as a veto, unless the minor initiates
the judicial review to "override" the veto. 22
Even if such a statute is not found to infringe on a minor's right of
privacy on the basis that it permits a parental veto, several other forms of in-
fringement result from this statute. It is acknowledged that minors are reluc-
tant to discuss their sexual activity with their parents. 23 Furthermore, a minor
woman may fear the result of informing her parents of her pregnancy. Re-
quiring a minor to inform her parents of her pregnancy and of her desire to
have an abortion may have a profound effect on both the nature of the
minor's deliberations as to whether to have an abortion and on how that deci-
sion is to be carried out. 24 Although abortion is safest when performed in the
early stages of pregnancy, a minor who has decided to have an abortion may
be deterred from seeking that abortion as early as is desirable, while she con-
templates whether or not to consult her parents and obtain a legal abortion
or to resort to an illegal one for which she need not obtain parental con-
sent.2 5 Even if she eventually decides to consult her parents, precious time has
been lost. If, on the other hand, the minor decides not to consult her
parents, she may be forced into a course of action she would not have followed
'
5 Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 145 (1976).
"Baird v. Attorney Gen., 360 N.E.2d 288, 294 (Mass. 1976).
21The Massachusetts statute provides that judicial consent may be obtained "[i]f one or
both of the mother's parents refuse such consent. MASS. ANN. LAWS. ch. 112, § 12P
(MiEhie/Law. Co-op 1975).
'Statutes that prohibit abortion or give a third party an absolute veto over the woman's
decision whether to terminate her pregnancy most clearly infringe on the woman's right of
privacy. Statutes which, rather than proscribing abortion, impose strict procedural requirements
which must be complied with before a woman can obtain an abortion may also infringe on a
woman's right to privacy. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 195-200 (1973). There are two features of
the procedure which a minor must follow under a statute such as that of Massachusetts which
substantially infringe on her right to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy: the requirement
of parental consultation, and the nature of the judicial proceeding in cases where a minor seeks
court consent to her decision to abort.
"SStein, Furnishing Information and Medical Treatment to Minors for Prevention, Ter-
mination and Treatment of Pregnancy, 5 CLEARINGHOUSE REv., 131, 154 (1971).
21"For example, the minor may have become pregnant through an act of incest and be un-
willing to have this known to her mother. Or the minor may have reasonable grounds for believ-
ing that knowledge of her pregnancy would result in severe punitive sanctions by her family."
Pilpel and Zuckerman, Abortion and the Rights of Minors, in ABORTION, SOCIETY AND THE LAW
275, 296 (D. Walbert & J. Butler eds. 1973).
2sSee Foster & Freed, A Bill of Rights for Children, 6 FAM. L. Q. 343. 359 (1972); Pilpel.
Minors' Rights to Medical Care, 36 ALB. L. REV. 462 (1972).
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had she not been required to obtain parental consent. 2 6 She may decide to bear
the unwanted child, run away, try to self-abort, or seek an illegal and
possibly unsafe abortion, as a result of the obstacles that a statute requiring
parental consultation puts upon her right to decide whether or not to ter-
minate her pregnancy. 27
A statute such as that of Massachusetts does not provide the minor's
parents with an absolute veto over their daughter's decision to have an abor-
tion. The method by which the veto of the parents may be overriden,
however, is of such a nature as to infringe upon the minor's exercise of her
right to decide whether or not to have an abortion. If the minor is unwilling
to have her parents learn of the pregnancy, then the right to an abortion is
made no more accessible by the possibility of obtaining a court order, since
the court's consent order may be entered only "if one or both of the mother's
parents refuse such consent. '" 28
Even if the minor consults her parents, is refused consent, and desires to
obtain the consent of the court, the obstacles she will encounter in initiating
and pursuing litigation may "comprise an unworkable burden." 29 Recognizing
this "unworkable burden," the Washington Supreme Court noted: "Minor
women unwilling to add litigation against their parents to their already acute
personal difficulties would gain little from the possibility of court interven-
tion."30 A decision to obtain a court order presupposes sufficient legal
sophistication to be aware of the existence of the remedy, a sophistication not
possessed by most children.3 1 Once the decision to obtain a court order is
made, the minor would be faced with the task of obtaining counsel. 3 2 In most
26Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787, 793 n.11 (5th Cir. 1975).
2See Pilpel & Zuckerman, Abortion and the Rights of Minors, in ABORTION, SOCIETY AND
THE LAW 275, 283 (D. Walbert &J. Butler eds. 1973); Note, The Minor's Right to Abortion and
the Requirement of Parental Consent, 60 VA. L. REV. 305, 324 (1974).
Another effect of a statute requiring parental consultation or consent is that it is likely to
inhibit communication between the minor and her family physician. Where a statute requires a
minor to consult her parents and to attempt to receive their consent before a legal abortion can
be performed, a minor may be unwilling to confide in her family physician for fear he will notify
her parents in an attempt to obtain consent. Under such circumstances, the minor may resort in-
stead to a "no questions asked" illegal abortionist. This deprives the minor of a valuable source
of advice and guidance from a skilled professional who by knowing her would be in an excellent
position to counsel her about her decision. Id. at 328.
"
8MAss. ANN. LAWS. ch. 112, § 12P (Michie/Law. Co-op 1975).
"State v. Koome, 84 Wash. 2d 901, 906, 530 P.2d 260, 264 (1975).351d.
3'See Note, Counseling the Counselors: Legal Implications of Counseling Minors without
Parental Consent, 31 MD. L. REV. 332, 337 (1971).
"2Since the court order will be given for "good cause shown," the minor will most probably
need legal assistance in presenting her case. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, when
questioned about the judicial procedure to be used to obtain the court order, gave its opinion
that the hearing would be an adversary one with the parents as the defendants. Baird v. Attorney
Gen., 360 N.E.2d 288, 297. While no final opinion has been rendered as to whether counsel
would be necessary for the minor during the hearing, the court states its doubt "that the
Legislature intended in all cases that an indigent minor should proceed without counsel in seek-
ing authorization of an abortion. ... Id. at 301. This statement suggests that counsel will be
needed in at least some cases. Even if counsel is not necessary to show "good cause," an attorney
would most probably be the vehicle used for getting into the court system. An attorney would
[Vol. 52:837
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situations, minors "generally have not enjoyed representation by lawyers as
frequently as adults. "3 3 If the minor personally knows an attorney, he would
most likely be a friend of the family, so that it may be even harder for the
minor to convince the attorney to represent her in an action to obtain an
abortion against the will of her parents. Even if a minor finds a lawyer will-
ing to take the case, the problem of compensation may stand in the way of
the minor's representation.
3 4
The delays inherent in a legal proceeding of this sort further infringe on
the minor's right to decide whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.3 1
Since abortion is safest when performed early in pregnancy,3 6 the delay of a
court hearing may postpone the implementation of the minor's decision until
a time when the abortion is much more dangerous to her. Not only is there
the delay of the court hearing itself, but there is also the possibility of ap-
pellate review.3 7 When the delays of litigation are considered in conjunction
with the facts that minors often refuse to believe they are pregnant until well
into the first trimester of pregnancy, and that litigation could well be pre-
ceded by a lengthy session of parental consultation and family crisis, the
burden of a court hearing to override parental refusal to consent may be a
substantial infringement on the minor's decision to terminate her pregnancy.
Even if the minor chooses to seek a court order, its procurement depends
upon the court's determination that the abortion is in the minor's best in-
terests. Thus if a minor has made a personal decision to have an abortion,
after consultation with her parents, and that decision may be viewed by the
minor's attending physician as in her best interests, her decision may still be
blocked if the court decides that the abortion is not in her best interests.3 8
This raises serious constitutional questions. When the court has the power to
override a good faith decision of a minor woman and her doctor, the
woman's right of privacy in relation to her doctor and the intimacy that rela-
tionship requires is destroyed. This infringement on the relationship of a
woman and her doctor violates her fundamental right of privacy as severely as
does a parental veto. 39
also probably be needed for the appeals process foreseen by the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts. Id. at 298.
'
3 Kleinfeld, The Balance of Power Among Infants, Their Parents and the State, 4 FAM.
L.Q. 319, 340 (1970).
; 4"Where money generally has not been available, either because of poverty of the child's
family or because his parents were proceeding against him and he had no money of his own ...
representation has been thoroughly inadequate." Id. at 341.
"State v. Koome, 84 Wash. 2d 901, 917, 530 P.2d 260, 269 (1975) (Finley, J., concurring).36See note 51 infra.
"The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts had "no question concerning the speedy
disposition of any appeal." Baird v. Attorney Gen., 360 N.E.2d 288, 298 (Mass. 1977). They cite
one case which was reported to the court and decided two days later, but admit "this prompt
disposition may have been facilitated by the fact that the case was entered in the Supreme
Judicial Court . . . and promptly reserved and reported for decision by a single justice of this
court." Id. In actuality, speedy appellate review is the exception rather than the rule, and no
special procedure to assure speedy review is provided for by the statute or foreseen by the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
'See note 5 supra.
'
9See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), which held unconstitutional a statute which re-
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Any statute which removes complete control over the decision to abort
from a woman, minor or not, and her physician thus seriously infringes on
the woman's constitutional right of privacy. 40 This infringement cannot be
upheld without a showing by the state of a compelling interest which is
achieved by the narrowest means available. 41
POSSIBLE COMPELLING STATE INTERESTS
The fact that a minor does possess the right of privacy does not mean
that the state may never infringe upon its exercise. Where a state statute in-
fringes upon fundamental personal rights, however, the state must show that
the statute was enacted to further a "compelling state interest" 42 and that the
interest is not "pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal
liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved." 43 When a statute
purports to regulate the activities of minors, it has been recognized that the
state's authority is broader than its authority to regulate the activities of
adults. 44 But where a minor's fundamental rights are infringed by a statute,
the "broader authority" of the state does not substantially affect the strength
of the showing a state must make in support of its statute. 45 While the
quired the approval of a hospital committee before an abortion could be performed, even though
the woman's own physician had approved the abortion. The Court stated that "[t]he woman's
right to receive medical care in accordance with her licensed physician's best judgment and the
physician's right to administer it are substantially limited by this statutorily imposed overview."
Id. at 197.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Douglas stated:
Crucial here, however, is state-imposed control over the medical decision whether
pregnancy should be interrupted. The good-faith decision of the patients' chosen
physician is overridden and the final decision passed on to others in whose selection the
patient has no part. This is a total destruction of the right of privacy between physi-
cian and patient and the intimacy of relation which that entails ...
Id. at 219.
If the approval of other physicians was held to infringe to too great a degree on the right of
privacy between physician and patient, the court's review of a doctor's professional opinion would
similarly intrude on this right.
"The minor woman's right of equal protection under the laws may also be infringed. See
note 10 supra.4 1The Supreme Court recently recognized that the same strict scrutiny that is applied to
statutes prohibiting abortion must be applied to "state regulations that burden an individual's
right to decide to prevent conception or terminate pregnancy by substantially limiting access to
the means of effectuating that decision. . . . [S]uch access is essential to exercise of the constitu-
tionally protected right of decision in matters of childbearing. Carey v. Population Serv.
Int'l, 97 S. Ct. 2010, 2018 (1977).42Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960).
4SNAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964). Although the NAACP case involved
freedom of association, the analysis used therein is cited in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 485 (1965), a case which dealt with the right of privacy.
"Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944).
"See West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), in which the Court
recognized the right of children to exercise their religion. The case, however, was actually de-
cided on the right of free speech, and the Court used the same "clear and present danger" test
applicable when the state restricts the rights of adults. See also Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S.
629 (1968), in which the requisite showing by the state in support of legislation prohibiting the
sale of certain obscene materials to minors was one of a rational relationship to a legitimate state
[Vol. 52:837
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Supreme Court in Planned Parenthood referred to the showing the state must
make in support of a statute infringing on the minor's right of privacy as a
"significant" rather than a compelling state interest, 4. the Court itself seems
unclear as to what extent this showing differs from the compelling state in-
terest test. 47 The rigor with which the Court applied the significant state in-
terest test in Planned Parenthood and in Carey v. Population Services Inter-
national,48 demonstrates that the standard "for all practical purposes ap-
proaches the 'compelling state interest' standard.."
49
In Roe v. Wade 0 the Supreme Court considered the compelling interests
of the state in regulating abortions in adult women. The two interests the
Court considered in that case were protection of maternal health and
safeguarding potential life. These, the Court held, were not compelling
enough interests during the first trimester of pregnancy to justify infringing
on an adult woman's right to have an abortion .5
interest, only because "obscenity is not protected expression and may be suppressed without a
showing of the circumstances which lie behind the phrase 'clear and present danger' in its ap-
plication to protected speech." 390 U.S. at 641. Thus the applicable constitutional analysis was
dictated by the nature of the right infringed, not the characteristics of the person protected by
the right. See also Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 97 S. Ct. 2010 (1977).
46428 U.S. at 75.4?In Carey v. Population Services International, the plurality states in a footnote that this
test "is apparently less rigorous than the 'compelling state interest' test." 97 S. Ct. at 2021 n.15
(emphasis added). It should be noted that in Roe v. Wade, the Court used the word "significant"
as a synonym for "compelling" when it stated that it is "appropriate for a State to decide that at
some point in time another interest [other than the woman's right of privacy] becomes
significantly involved." 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973).
In Population Services International, the Court states that this lesser scrutiny is justified
because of the state's broader authority in regulating the activities of children, yet this justifica-
tion only recognizes that the state may have a compelling interest in regulating the activities of
minors where such an interest would not exist to justify the regulation of the same activities as
applied to adults. For example, in Prince v. Massachusetts, the Court stated that "It is true
children have rights, in common with older people, in the primary use of highways. But even in
such use, streets afford dangers for them not affecting adults." 321 U.S. 158, 169 (1944). The
Court in Population Services International also justifies the lesser standard of scrutiny on the
basis that the right of privacy at issue is "the interest in independence in making certain kinds of
important decisions," and "the law has generally regarded minors as having a lesser capability for
making important decisions." 97 S. Ct. at 2021 n.15. However, skepticism as to the ability of
minors to exercise the right of privacy would justify holding it inapplicable to minors, but not in
reducing the level of interest a state must assert in infringing on the right once it has been held
to apply to minors.
4197 S. Ct. 2010 (1977).
4Id. at 2027-28 (Powell, J., concurring).
"°410 U.S. 113 (1973).
51During the first trimester of pregnancy, when the fetus is not yet viable and abortion as a
medical procedure carries with it fewer risks to a pregnant woman than does childbirth, id. at
149, neither state interests in protecting maternal health nor state interests in safeguarding
potential life are at that point compelling, and therefore the abortion decision "in all its aspects
is inherently, and primarily, a medical decision," and it must be left to the medical judgment of
the pregnant woman's physician. Id. at 166. After the first trimester, when the risks of abortion
to a pregnant woman increase, the state has a compelling interest in safeguarding the pregnant
woman's health and can regulate the abortion procedure by legislation reasonably related to the
accomplishment of thatinterest. Id. at 163. The Court gives examples of permissible state
regulation in furtherance of this interest: establishment of qualifications and licensing re-
quirements for physicians performing abortions and establishment of licensing requirements for
the type of facility where abortions may be performed. For the stage of pregnancy subsequent to
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Since the Roe decision dealt with compelling interests of the state vis-a-vis
adult women, it is arguable that the Supreme Court might find a compelling
interest with respect to minors even during the first three months of pregnan-
cy. 5 2 No additional interest of the state with respect to minors can be
asserted, however, in the area of protecting potential life, for no matter what
the age of the mother, viability is still the point where the state's interest in
protecting potential life becomes compelling.5 3 With regard to the asserted
interest of maternal health, "the teenage mother is 'high risk' medically in
almost every respect, during pregnancy and childbirth."54 This fact taken
together with the fact that, at least during the first trimester, abortion is safer
than pregnancy and childbirth,55 thus removes any interest the state might
advance in restricting the availability of abortions to minors on the grounds
of protecting maternal health.5 6 Sustaining an infringement on the minor's
right must thus be based on a compelling interest not considered in Roe.
The interests of the state in protecting the integrity of the family unit
and parental authority were asserted by the State of Missouri in Planned
Parenthood. The Supreme Court found these interests not to be compelling.
It stated:
It is difficult, however, to conclude that providing a parent with absolute
power to overrule a determination, made by the physician and his minor pa-
tient, to terminate the patient's pregnancy will serve to strengthen the family
unit. Neither is it likely that such veto power will enhance parental authority
or control where the minor and the nonconsenting parent are so fundamen-
tally in conflict and the very existence of pregnancy already has fractured the
family structure. Any independent interest the parent may have in the ter-
mination of the minor daughter's pregnancy is no more weighty than the
right of privacy of the competent minor [who is] mature enough to have
become pregnant.57
the viability of the fetus, the state's interest in the protection of potential life becomes com-
pelling, since at that point the fetus has the capability of meaningful life outside the mother's
womb, and the state may then regulate abortion to that end. Id.
52To some courts, the Roe holding was limited to consideration of only the two interests
asserted by the state of Texas in support of its statute, the protection of maternal health and the
safeguarding of potential life. See, e.g., State v. Koome, 84 Wash. 2d 901, 906-07, P.2d 260,
264 (1975). Thus, a statute regulating abortion might be sustained upon a showing by the state
of some additional compelling interest not considered by the Court in Roe.
To others, the Court's statement in Roe that during the first trimester of pregnancy the
abortion decision must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman's attending physi-
cian dictates the result that the state has no compelling interest in regulating abortion during the
first trimester or pregnancy. See, e.g., Wolfe v. Schroering, 388 F. Supp. 631 (W.D. Ky. 1974).
5 The Court in Roe states that setting the stage of viability as the point when the state's in-
terest in protecting potential life becomes compelling has "both logical and biological justifica-
tion," since that is the stage when the fetus is capable of meaningful life outside the womb. 410
U.S. 113, 163 (1972). The same logical and biological justifications would exist regardless of the
age of the mother, for what is of concern with regard to the state's interest in protecting poten-
tial life is the maturity of the fetus, not the maturity of the mother.54Pilpel and Wechsler, Birth Control, Teenagers and the Law, 1 FAMILY PLAN. PERSPEC-
TIvEs 29 (1969).
55See note 51 supra.
5 Note, The Minor's Right to Abortion and the Requirement of Parental Consent, 60 VA.
L. REv. 305, 327 (1974).
11428 U.S. at 75.
[Vol. 52:837
ABORTION STATUTES
Another interest often asserted in support of parental consent provisions
is the state's interest in ensuring that a minor's decision to complete or ter-
minate her pregnancy is an informed one,58 thus protecting the minor from
her own improvidence.5 9 In Planned Parenthood, the Supreme Court
acknowledged that the State of Missouri had asserted this interest. 60 Yet the
Court never directly discussed this interest, and thus left open the question of
whether such an interest could be compelling.6' An examination of this in-
terest, however, demonstrates that it, too, should be found to be noncom-
pelling.
The state interest in ensuring informed consent rests on the assumption
that a minor is not capable of making the decision whether or not to ter-
minate her pregnancy in her own best interest. Therefore, the intervention of
the state in requiring parental consultation or consent is necessary to protect
the minor's best interest: "Informed consent by the patient . . . has long been
necessary before a physician could render any services, and minors . ..were
considered incapable of effective consent. Thus parental consent was required
at common law as a substitute for the child's consent.
62
It will be difficult for a state to assert an interest based on the inability of
the minor to give effective consent if, as is the case with both the Missouri
and Massachusetts statutes, the written consent of the minor as well as that of
her parents is necessary before the abortion can be performed on the minor.
63
If the parents' consent is needed in lieu of the minor's consent, why is the
minor's consent needed, too? If the minor is incapable of giving informed
consent because she cannot make the decision in her own best interest, then
whether the minor consents or not should be irrelevant, if the interest of the
state is to protect the best interests of the minor.
6 4
5Igd. at 72-73; State v. Koome, 84 Wash. 2d 901, P.2d 260 (1975).
59Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787, 792 (5th Cir. 1975).
"°The State argued that Missouri law "is replete with provisions reflecting the interest of
the state in assuring the welfare of minors .... and that "[clertain decisions are considered by
the State to be outside the scope of a minor's ability to act in his own best interest .. " 428
U.S. at 72. "Thus, a State's permitting a child to obtain an abortion without the counsel of an
adult 'who has responsibility or concern for the child would constitute an irresponsible abdication
of the State's duty to protect the welfare of minors.' " Id. at 72-73.61Although the Court never discusses the state's interest in protecting a minor's informed
consent by requiring parental consent, the Court's inclination to deny such interest is supported
in its statement that "[t]he fault with § 3(4) [of the Missouri statute requiring parental consent] is
that it imposes a special consent provision, exercisable by a person other than the woman and
her physician, as a prerequisite to a minor's termination of her pregnancy and does so without a
sufficient justification for the restriction." 428 U.S. at 75 (emphasis added).
62Note, Parental Consent Requirements and Privacy Rights of Minors: the Contraceptive
Controversy, 88 HARv L. REv. 1001 (1975).
6 MAss. ANN. LAWS. ch. 112, § 12P (Michie/Law. Co-op 1975).
641t might be argued that the minor's consent is necessary, not because of her ability to
contribute to a determination of what is in her best interests, but only as a precaution to protect
the physician from possible charges of assault and battery which may follow unauthorized inva-
sions of the minor's body. However, the consent which must be given to protect a doctor from
possible assault charges is not a lesser consent than that which is involved in the minor's decision
to have an abortion: "To be valid, any consent must be an 'informed' one .. " Wadlington,
Minors and Health Care: The Age of Consent, 11 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 115 (1973).
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The state may also argue that requiring parental consultation or consent
is a means of ensuring that the minor will have guidance in making her deci-
sion whether or not to have an abortion. If so, then in order to show a com-
pelling state interest the state must demonstrate that the child is without suf-
ficient guidance absent state intervention. In Roe, the Court found that the
pregnant woman's attending physician provides significant guidance. Accor-
ding to Roe, the decision whether or not to terminate one's pregnancy is not
the woman's alone, even during the first trimester of pregnancy: "For the
stage prior to approximately the end of the first trimester, the abortion deci-
sion .. .must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman's at-
tending physician. "65 Thus the minor will not be making the decision alone.
Even if she is convinced that an abortion would be in her own best interest,
the decision must also be concurred in by her doctor.
Nor can it be maintained that either the scope or quality of guidance
which a minor would receive from her physician would differ significantly
from that which would be provided by the parents. Statutes requiring paren-
tal consent before an abortion can be performed on a minor have been inter-
preted to limit the permissible deliberations of the parents to an assessment of
what would be in their daughter's best interests.6 6 While the role of the doc-
tor in the abortion decision is referred to in Roe as the exercise of "medical
judgment," the variety of factors which a doctor may consider in arriving at
his decision has been recognized by the Court to be quite broad: "[M]edical
judgment may be exercised in the light of all factors-physical, emotional,
psychological, familial, and the woman's age-relevant to the well being of
the patient."6 7 While the parents may have a more personal knowledge of the
minor than the physician, it has been shown that because of their personal
attachment to their child, parents' reactions to their minor daughter's
pregnancy may result in a decision not in the minor's best interests. 68 Thus
6 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973)(emphasis added). See notes 66-69 infra & text
accompanying for a discussion as to the scope and quality of the doctor's role in the abortion
decision.
"Baird v. Attorney Gen., 360 N.E.2d 288, 292 (Mass. 1977).
"
7Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1972). As to the quality of the physician's counseling
expertise, Mr. Justice Blackmun states that "[t]he good physician . . . will have sympathy and
understanding for the pregnant patient that probably are not exceeded by those who participate
in other areas of professional counseling." Id. at 197.
In Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), Mr. justice Blackmun lists some of the "factors the
woman and her responsible physician will consider in consultation":
Mental and physical health may be taxed by child care. There is also the distress, for
all concerned, associated with the unwanted child, and there is the problem of bring-
ing a child into a family already unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care for it.
In other cases, as in this one, the additional difficulties and continuing stigma of
unwed motherhood may be involved.
Id. at 153.
6See, e.g., Baird v. Bellotti, 393 F. Supp. 847 (D. Mass. 1975) (finding that some parents
insist upon the continuation of their daughter's pregnancy as a punishment); State v. Koome, 84
Wash. 2d 901, 530 P.2d 260 (1975) (father of the minor opposed the abortion in the belief that
requiring her to continue her pregnancy would deter her from becoming pregnant in the future
and her guardian opposed the abortion on religious grounds).
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the detachment of the physician may allow him to make a more objective
determination of what would serve the best interests of the child.6 9
Given the scope and nature of the physician's role in the abortion deci-
sion, the state's interest in ensuring the welfare of the minor is well protected
without the necessity of state intervention. 70 The state cannot thus successfully
argue that a minor is without sufficient guidance in making the decision as to
whether or not an abortion would be in her own best interests.71
In legislation regarding other categories of health care, many states, in-
cluding Massachusetts and Missouri, have themselves recognized the limita-
tions of parental consent requirements. These statutes, which allow minors to
receive medical care without parental consultation or consent, most often
apply to treatment of drug addiction or rehabilitation, pregnancy and
childbirth, family planning or birth control, and venereal disease. 72 This
legislation recognizes that a requirement of parental consultation or consent
may be counterproductive in furthering the best interests of the minor by
deterring the minor from seeking needed medical services as early as
desirable.73 S States have recognized that minors may be unwilling to consult
their parents, and have determined that the interest in ensuring an informed
consent must be subordinated to the state's greater interest in ensuring that
the minor receives medical treatment as soon as possible. A similar reluctance
to consult one's parents exists when the minor is pregnant and considering
abortion. Considering the high incidence of physical and psychological risks
associated with pregnancy and childbirth during the teenage years,74 and the
posible problems which unwed motherhood may impose on a minor,75 in
"For guidelines as to the physician's role in counsdling patients considering abortion, see
Marcn & Marcin, The Physician's Decision-Making Role in Abortion Cases, 35 THE JURIST 66(1975); Proceedings of the AMA House of Delegates 220 (June 1970); Butler & Fujita, Abortion
Screening and Counseling: A Brief Guide for Physicians, 50 POSTGRADUATE MEDICINE 208 (1971);
Margolis, Some Thoughts on Medical Evaluation and Counseling of Applicants for Abortion, 14
CLINICAL OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY 1255 (1971.
7°If the state felt that the ordinary counseling process between patient and physician was in-
adequate to meet the needs of the minor, a statute might provide for a period of counseling by
the physician, with material specially geared to the needs of minors to be covered during that
counseling. In order to insure that such couneling did take place, a certificate of consultation.
signed by patient and physician might be required.
"If the state felt that counseling in addition to that between doctor and patient was
necessary, it might require evidence of consultation with' a professional counseling agency,
although if expense or an extended period of counseling is involved the question of undue burden
on the minor's right to privacy will arise. In any event, the requirement of consultation with a
party other than the parents may be shown to be at least as effective as consultation with the
parents in improving the quality of the decisionmaking process when a minor is considering ter-
minating her pregnancy.
"2E.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 25-6-201 (1974) (birth control services); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
13, § 707 (Michie 1975) (pregnancy treatment); IND. CODE § 16-8-5-1 (1976) (venereal disease);
MASS. ANN. LAWS. ch. 112, § 12E (Michie/Law. Co-op 1975) (drug- addiction); VA. CODE §
32-137 (1973) (venereal disease).
73Wadlington, Minors and Health Care: The Age of Consent, 11 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 115,
122 (1975).
7Schwartz, Abortion on Request: The Psychiatric Implications, in ABORTION, SOCIETY AND
THE LAw 139, 152 (D. Walbert & J. Butler eds. 1973).
7See Menken, The Health and Social Consequences of Teenage Childlbearing, 4 FAMILY
PLAN. PERSPECTIVES 43 (1972).
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many cases abortion may be in the best interests of the minor. If so, the state
would have a compelling interest, as in the areas of venereal disease and
pregnancy, in ensuring that the treatment be undertaken as soon as possible,
since that is when the procedure is safest.7 6 It will be very difficult for the
state to assert that its interest in ensuring an informed decision in the case of
abortion is compelling enough to overcome its interest in promoting timely
medical treatment, especially since the interest of the state "in protecting
minors from improvidently consenting to medical treatment is not consistently
asserted and appears not to be present in a variety of health situations .... 77
Such an interest does not fit the definition of a compelling state interest given
by the Supreme Court in Thomas v. Collins: "Only the gravest abuses, en-
dangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation. " 78
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has held unconstitutional statutes requiring parental
consent before an abortion can be performed on an unmarried minor.
However, no ruling has yet been made with regard to statutes requiring
parental consent, but which provide for the possibility of a court order in lieu
of parental consent when a minor shows good cause for granting such an
order. While such statutes do not give parents an absolute veto over their
daughter's decision to have an abortion, the statutes do infringe on the
minor's constitutionally protected right to determine whether or not to ter-
minate her pregnancy.
Since the physician plays a mandatory role in any woman's decision to
have an abortion, the state's asserted interest based on the premise that
minors are without sufficient guidance in making the decision is not compell-
ing. If the state's interest in guidance were recognized by the Court, such
statutes would nevertheless fall, since there are other methods for ensuring an
informed decision by a minor which would not infringe so greatly on the
minor's rights, and which would be more effective in accomplishing any in-
terest which the state might have in protecting the welfare of minors.
BARBARA FREEDMAN WAND
.!gSee note 51 supra.
"Pilpel & Zuckerman, Abortion and the Rights of Minors, in ABORTION, SOCIETY AND THE
LAW 275, 289 (D. Walbert & J. Butler eds. 1973).
78323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945).
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